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Introduction
The “New Classical Macroeconomists” seem to pride themselves of pursuing a rig-
orous approach tomacroeconomic phenomena (LUCAS and SARGENT, 1979). Yet its
foundations are shaky, and its terminology is confused. This will be outlined in the
following. Section 1 starts by explaining TINBERGEN’s approach to estimating eco-
nomic relationships. This approach, involving time-invariant behavioral relations,
has been carried to the extreme by the New Classical Macoeconomists. KEYNES crit-
icised the assumption that the parameters in economic models are to be taken as
remaining constant over decades or even centuries. This critique is outlined in Sec-
tion 2 and remains valid to-day. As it comprises the “LUCAS critique,” albeit as a mi-
nor point only, it seems confusing and inappropriate that the proponents present
the originally Keynesian arguments as a critique of “Keynesian” macroeconomics.
It is possible to copewith these issues by allowing economic structures to change
over time (Section 3). This line of analysis follows the arguments advanced by MAR-
SHALL who was deeply convinced that economic systems evolve and incessantly
change over time, and that the stationary state is a fiction, useful as an analytical
construct perhaps, but inappropriate in any descriptive sense. While MARSHALL
tried to cope with the issue that economic relationships change over time in a se-
rious manner by devising his temporary equilibrium method, the New Classical
Macroeconomists pursued a different path: They rejected the idea of an ever-
changing economic universe as a modelling framework and simply declared that
everything that may change over time is not “structural” and can, therefore not be
taken as a given when analyzing the implications of a change in policies (Section 4).
Such a position excludes institutional explanations right away as “superficial” and
abrogates the MARSHALLian idea of starting from some givens for purposes of short-
run analysis, take them as provisional constants, fix them under a ceteris-paribus-
clause for the time being, but allow them to change in the longer term, and even
explain this change; and further, that anything that remains constant within some
period will become variable if we consider a still longer time-span. Contrary to what
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the New Classical Macroeconomists assert, the MARSHALLian approach is compati-
ble with evaluating economic policy, as long as “piecemeal engineering” in the sense
of POPPER (1971) is considered. That the MARSHALLian visionmay rule out “utopian
engineering” may be conceded. If the New Classical Macroeconomists aim for the
latter, they should say so.
1 Tinbergen’s Method
In a pioneering contribution, TINBERGEN (1939) has introduced regression analy-
sis into economics in order to quantify economic relationships. This, along with
a number of subsequent contributions, has established the pattern for subsequent
econometric research up to the present (TINBERGEN, 1952, 1956).
The proposal was to start from “primary relations” between the economic vari-
ables. These were conceived as representing the “direct logical ties between the
variables introduced by economic behaviour or by the logic of definition or tech-
nique”(TINBERGEN, 1952, 13). These primary relations constitute the structural mo-
del of the economic phenomena under study. The problem was to estimate the
behavioral coefficients that enter the structural model. Once these coefficients are
known, alternative courses of economic policy can be evaluatedwith respect to their
outcomes.
TINBERGEN proposed regression analysis for determining the structural coeffi-
cients. These coefficients were assumed to remain constant over time. The proposal
was pursued for reasons of practicability, as a provisional approach that was accept-
able for lack of better techniques. In spite of this caution, TINBERGEN put economics
(and econometrics) on a narrow track that way, setting the pattern for quantitative
economic research for over half a century to come. This seems problematic.
2 Keynes’ Critique
KEYNES (1939, 559, 566), in particular, was concerned that “Tinbergen’sMethod”was
too mechanic, and therefore unable to deal with “qualitative theories.” TINBERGEN
himself was, in KEYNES’ view, too insouciant in his application of regression analysis
to economic data: “If only he is allowed to carry on, he is quite ready and happy at
the end of it to go a long way toward admitting, with an engaging modesty, that the
results probably have no value. The worst of him is that he is much more interested
in getting onwith the job than in spending time in deciding whether the job is worth
getting on with.” And he continues:
“Thirty years ago I used to be occupied in examining the slippery problem of
passing from statistical description to inductive generalisation in the case of
simple correlation; and to-day in the era of multiple correlation I do not find
that in this respect practice is much improved. In case . . . others may nurse in-
ductive hopes, it is worth pointing out that Prof. Tinbergenmakes the least pos-
sible preparation for the inductive transition. Put broadly, the most important
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condition is that the environment in all relevant respects, other than the fluctu-
ations in those factors of which we take particular account, should be uniform
and homogeneous over a period of time. KEYNES (1939, 566)
Given that KEYNES’ teacher ALFREDMARSHALL (1949, III.IV.1) was so much con-
cerned with “the element of time, the source of many of the greatest difficulties
in economics,” and devised his temporary equilibrium method in order to theo-
retically capture an ever-changing economic universe, KEYNES’ criticism of the as-
sumed time-invariance of the structural parameter is not surprising. Yet KEYNES
went even further:
“It seems to me that economics is a branch of logic, a way of thinking . . . a sci-
ence of thinking in terms of models joined to the art of choosing models which
are relevant to the contemporary world. It is compelled to be this because, un-
like the typical natural science, thematerial to which it is applied is, in toomany
respects, not homogeneous through time. The object of a model is to segregate
semi-permanent or relatively constant factors from those which are transitory
or fluctuating so as to develop a logical way of thinking about the latter, and of
understanding the time sequences to which they give rise in particular cases . .
. . In chemistry and physics and in other natural sciences the object of experi-
ment is to fill in the actual values of the various quantities and factors appearing
in an equation or formula; and the work when done is once and for all. In eco-
nomics this is not the case, and to convert a model into a quantitative formula
is to destroy its usefulness as an instrument of thought.. . . To do so wouldmake
it useless as a model. For as soon as this is done, the model loses its generality
and its value as a mode of though. . . . If the method cannot prove or disprove
a qualitative theory and if it cannot give a qualitative guide to the future, is it
worth while ? " (KEYNES 1973, 296 ff.; 1939, 566)
Here, it seems tome, KEYNES went too far. As TINBERGEN observed correctly: “Coef-
ficients changing just by chance would, of course, render the whole of quantitative
economic science impossible” (in KEYNES 1973, 292). His pragmatic, yet slightly bi-
ased, way in dealing with the issue is well reflected in his defense:
“If there is no reason to suppose that the laws that have governed the reactions
of individuals and firms in the past will have changed in the near future, it seems
possible to reach conclusions for the near future bymeasuring as exactly as pos-
sible those same reactions in the past. Of course this is only true if no structural
changes take place” (TINBERGEN, 1940, 152).
Yet this position begs the question: If, using TINBERGEN’s definition of structural pa-
rameters, it is assumed that “no structural change takes place”, this amounts to the
assumption that economic relations remain constant over time – and this assump-
tion lies at the heart of KEYNES’ critique.
3 Time-Varying Coefficients
Looking more closely at the arguments put forward by TINBERGEN and KEYNES, it
appears that both agree on what is desired, but disagree about to what extend re-
gression analysis meets that goal. TINBERGEN (1940, 152) holds that "in most cases
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only small changes in structure will occur in the near future", and defends regres-
sion analysis with this argument. KEYNES (1973, 294) concurs with the statement
but adds a destructive qualification: “One of the chief dilemmas facing you is, of
course, ... that themethod requires not too short a series whereas it is only in a short
series, in most cases, that there is a reasonable expectation that the coefficients will
be fairly constant" (KEYNES 1973, 294).
I have argued elsewhere thatMARSHALL conceived economic relationships, such
as behavioral equations, as changing over time, but more slowly than the processes
that are explained in terms of these relationships (SCHLICHT, 1977, 1985). The argu-
ment may be summarized in the “Isolation Principle” that requires that behavioral
parameters of a model are permitted to change over time, but only slowly, as com-
pared to the speed of adaptation of the endogenous variables.1
A “slow” movement of the behavioral coefficients implies that these coefficients
are highly auto-correlated over time. The marginal propensity to save to-day will
be close to the marginal propensity to save of yesterday, for example. This would
suffice to permit an application of the consumption function for purposes of eval-
uating effects of tax changes, even if the consumption function changes over time,
and the time-span of such predictions will correspond to the relative stability of the
consumption function in this case.
Some economists have proposed a straightforward formalization of this idea
(COOLEY and PRESCOTT 1973, SCHLICHT 1973, ATHANS 1974). Assuming a linear
regression, coefficients can be allowed to change over time:
yt = a0,t +a1,t x2,t + ... +an,t xn,t +ut
Here time is denoted by t , the n exogenous variables are denoted by x1,t ,x2,t , ... +
xn,t , and the disturbance term is ut . Now the change of the coefficients can, in the
simplest case, be formalized as a randomwalk
ai ,t = ai ,t−1+ vi ,t
where vi ,t denotes the change of coefficient i fromperiod t−1 to period t . Assuming
that the disturbances ut ,v0,t ,v1,t , ...vn,t are normally i.i.d. distributed, the variances
of the disturbances in the coefficients vi ,t measure the instability of the respective
coefficient over time. These variances can be estimated by Kalman-filter methods
or easily available program packages (LUDSTECK, 2004; SCHLICHT, 2005).
4 Chasing theMirage of a “True Structure”
Given that the shortcomings of regression analysis for purposes of economic analy-
sis were correctly identified by KEYNES in the middle of the last century, and that
the statistical techniques for estimating time-varying coefficients are available for
1The Isolation Principle, comprising “temporal” and “causal” isolation, summarizes arguments to be
found in MARSHALL, KEYNES, and in the writings of a number of other economists. The mathematical
background for the Isolation Principle is provided by theMoving Equilibrium Theorem (SCHLICHT, 1978,
1997).
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more than twenty years, it could have been expected that econometric practice and
macro-economic model building would have embodied these ideas; but this is not
the case. Macroeconomics took a quite different and, I thing, wrong turn.
Weight the papers by LUCAS (1976) and LUCAS and SARGENT (1979) which are
considered seminal by many. LUCAS (1976) criticised TINBERGEN’s “Theory of Eco-
nomic Policy” – which KEYNES called “TINBERGEN’s method” – with the argument
that behavioral coefficients may change if policy changes occur. (In a similar vein,
KEYNES (1939, 561) asked TINBERGEN: “What happens if the phenomenon under in-
vestigation itself reacts on the factors by which we are explaining it?”) This is just a
special case of the general point that economic relationsmust be expected to change
over time.2
LUCAS (1976) accepted the time-varying coefficients approach for purposes of
short-term forecasting, but this remained a lip-service, as he insisted that this ap-
proach is not useful for policy purposes because it does not give quantitative long-
term predictions: “Under the adaptive structure, a small standard error of short-
term forecasts is consistent with infinite variance of the long-term operating char-
acteristics of the system.” The argument neglects that what “short term” and “long
term” ismust, in a MARSHALLian framework, be seen relative to the time-scale of the
model used. So a “short term” may be quite long if the model is a long-termmodel,
even if it is not conceived as being time-invariant for all eternity.
The LUCASian search for the mirage of a “true structure” has dominated macro-
economic theorizing for the last twenty years. LUCAS and SARGENT (1979, 6) criticise
what they call “Keynesian models” by observing: “We see no reason to believe that
these models have isolated structures which will remain invariant across the class
of interventions that figure in contemporary discussions of economic policy”. Their
aim is, apparently, to find models with parameters that remain invariant across the
class of possible inventions and – I submit – remain invariant over time.
Yet the idea that there exists a “true economic structure” that remains constant
over decades, let alone centuries, and across policies, seems preposterous. It is, of
course, easy to criticise any realistic theory because it starts from “superficial” char-
acteristics, but such a criticism implies that there actually exist some perennial and
enduring structures, presumably stable and invariant over decades, even centuries
(LUCAS and SARGENT, 1979, 11). The NewClassical Macroeconomists provide no ar-
gument for their postulate apart from the assertion that “all practitioners knew it to
be necessary” LUCAS (1976, 24). The argument neglects, further, the MARSHALLian
innovation of building theories on such “superficial” characteristics.
5 Terminological Confusion
The argument of theNewClassicalMacroeconomists is further confoundedby state-
ments that are simply confusing. They emphasize what they call the “classical pos-
tulates:” “(a) that markets clear and (b) that agents act in their own self-interest.”
2The particular problem emphasized by LUCAS (1976) seems empirically not very important, see
LINDÉ (2001). KEYNES’ general point is fully justified by recent studies about the Phillips curve, such
as BALL and MANKIW (2002), though.
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If both postulates are fulfilled, we have an equilibrium in the sense of LUCAS and
SARGENT (1979, 7).
Regarding the principle ofmarket clearance they point out that “Clearedmarkets
is simply a principle, not verifiable by direct observation, which may or may not
be useful in constructing successful hypotheses about the behavior of these series.”
Here they simply iterate what HICKS has formulated muchmore carefully:
There is a sense in which current supplies and current demands are always
equated in competitive conditions. Stocks may indeed be left unsold; but they
are unsold because people prefer to take chance of being able to sell them at a
future date rather than cut prices in order to sell them now. . . . In this (analyt-
ically important) sense the economic system . . . can be taken to be always in
equilibrium . . . ”3
Given this concept of market clearance, any theory, including KEYNES’, could be
characterized as fulfilling assumption (a), but such an assertion comes down to a
play with words, and a confounding of issues.
Regarding equilibrium, LUCAS and SARGENT (1979, 7) correctly note that indi-
vidual rationality does not carry over to markets, and that their concept of equilib-
rium is empty: “. . . the general hypothesis that a collection of time series describes
an economy in competitive equilibrium is without content” (LUCAS and SARGENT,
1979, 7).
Insisting onmarket clearance and rationalitywhile attributing to others that they
violate these principles, and, at the same time, emphasizing that these concepts are
empty, is confusing. Such phrases appear to me substantially irrelevant, but they
obfuscate substantial issues.
Conclusion
In this note it has been urged that the assumption of time-invariant behavioral re-
lations has been introduced by TINBERGEN for practical reasons and as an approxi-
mation appropriate for short-period analysis only. The New Classical Macroecono-
mists have carried this assumption to the extreme by postulating the existence of
ever-lasting and invariant economic structures.
KEYNES has criticised the invariance assumption as quite inadequate for most
economic applications, as we must assume that economic relations will drift over
time and in response to economic processes and policies. TheNewClassicalMacro-
economists have criticised allegedly “Keynesian” theories with KEYNES own argu-
ments. This misuse of terms – also exemplified by the misuse of terms like market
clearance and equilibrium – has created confusion on the semantic level and led, on
a more popular level, to the impression that all unemployment is “voluntary” with-
out taking notice that this is, in the New Classical Macroeconomics, not a statement
about any fact, but a postulate.
3HICKS (1946, 131). Let me note that this principle – what I have called the HICKS-D’ALEMBERT-
Principle, applies not only to theWALRASian equilibrium concept (clearedmarkets) but to other concepts
as well, such as the Swedish (ex ante-ex post) or the MARSHALLian one (state toward things are tending),
see SCHLICHT (1978, 1985).
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It is to be hoped that a new generation of economists will start to think the issues
over again, and study their classics more carefully in order to avoid the semantic
traps encountered in the “New Classical Macroeconomics” and devise quantitative
theories that can copewith ever-changing economic environments. It is to be hoped
thatmacroeconomics and econometrics some day catches upwithMARSHALL – and
KEYNES.
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